News & Views item - July 2007

 

 

One Year On from the UK's All Party Parliamentary Climate Change Group's Report Is a Cross-Party Consensus on Climate Change Possible – Or Desirable? (July 19, 2007)

    Just over a year ago -- July 13, 2006 -- Britain's APPCCG, All-Party Parliamentary Climate Change Group, brought down a fifty-two page report whose title asked the question Is a Cross-Party Consensus on Climate Change Possible – Or Desirable?

 

The "Group" consisted of 99 parliamentarians 85 MPs and 14 members of the House of Lords, while the report itself was prepared by Dr Helen Clayton, Professor Nick Pidgeon and Professor Mark Whitby.

 

The Labor MP, Colin Challen, chaired the group which put forward fourteen "conclusions and recommendations".

 

Now that 53 weeks have passed and Gordon Brown has replaced Tony Blair as Britain's Prime Minister, Science has asked Colin Challan to contribute this week's editorial which he's titled "Playing Climate Change Poker".

 

Mr Challan opens with "[M]uch discussion about tackling climate change anticipates having achieved something by the middle of this century. What's the target? Both the European Union (EU) and, at a national level, the United Kingdom have focused on a CO2 emissions cut of at least 60%, which is intended to reduce average global warming by 2°C.

 

"What are the chances of meeting the 2° objective? Not likely, according to Malte Meinshausen of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology... a 60% cut in atmospheric CO2... leaves a probability between 63% and 99% of missing the 2°C target," and Dr Meinshausen's calculations have resulted in "[b]oth the UK and EU proposals indicating that their emissions reduction targets might be toughened."

 

Mr Challen makes this observation: "In a democracy, it is difficult to convince voters that they should take actions, especially expensive ones, to avoid an as yet largely unseen and unquantifiable danger. How do you base a policy that is likely to have significant economic impacts on model data and forecasts that some might regard as guesswork? We only need to recall the false economy of not spending taxpayers' dollars on building up the New Orleans levees to realize how actions taken today could avert a long-range problem. Delay, combined with the risk that sceptics may accuse the Al Gores of this world of "crying wolf," could make tougher policies harder to adopt later," and he the bluntly tells his government that any legislation that is brought down "needs to make explicit the formula used to arrive at any target that government sets. That formula should tell us not only the size of the cake but also how we calculate our share of it."

 

However, as he points out, so far the draft bill fulfils neither criterion and he closes with the admonition, "If it did, that would surely boost confidence that the result is designed to solve the problem faster than we're creating it."

 

How to garner the data?  That's left unanswered. But not to get on with beginning to reinforce the levies while waiting for the catastrophe to strike and then paying the high price in trying to repairing the damage would appear a tad irresponsible.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Conclusions and Recommendations of the APPCCG on July 13, 2006


1. There was very broad agreement across the majority of submissions that a cross-party consensus on climate change would be desirable, that this should be grounded in the scientific evidence, and that the existing emissions targets provide important existing points of consensus.

2. We note that the existing political consensus on a target 60% cut in greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 may need to be revisited, in the direction of a cross-party commitment to even tougher action, when the 4th assessment report from the IPPC is published in 2007. We also note the need for an effective post-Kyoto international framework agreement that includes concentrations-based targets for stabilising atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations.

3. Given the almost overwhelming support for the principle of a cross-party consensus in the submissions, we recommend that the Government should seek ways to take this forward in a constructive and practical manner and with some urgency.

4. We also recommend that the opposition parties should not abandon their efforts to find common ground for building upon their initial consensus proposals.

5. There is already common ground between the major parties on long-term targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. But scope exists for a consensus that extends beyond targets to at least some means for meeting them.

6. A consensus on means for tacking climate change (which extends beyond simple agreement on targets) does not have to be ‘all or nothing’. The best way forward would seem to be to seek a consensus on targets, and on a long-term policy framework including at least some of the principal means for achieving those targets, but without stifling legitimate and healthy political debate or opportunities for innovation. We recommend strongly that the parties pursue this course.

7. In the presence of an agreed long-term policy framework, each party’s detailed approach should offer a reasonable chance of meeting the targets. In this way, the electorate would retain some choice over detailed approach. Independent assessment of party policies could influence both the policies and the parties’ electoral chances. Such assessment could be part of the role of an independent expert body (point 12, below).

8. None of the presumed barriers to consensus is either too large or overwhelming to be addressed successfully. Furthermore, examples do exist in the UK where a consensus was forged (World War II, Northern Ireland) because of the pressing need to take long-term and durable decisions in the face of a major national challenge.

9. We recommend that the Government and opposition parties work together to agree a long-term strategy to support the development and implementation of effective consensus policies on climate change, and to ensure that, through those and other policies, the UK meets effective national and international targets. Ideally, a linked series of milestones would be set, to which all constituents could subscribe and be held accountable.

10. It is difficult to see how a genuine consensus could be taken forward without government involvement. Accordingly we recommend that the Prime Minister take joint ownership of the cross-party consensus process. This could involve convening a cross-party climate policy group of MPs and Peers, informed by the best scientific assessments, to agree areas of consensus and seek input from a wide range of stakeholders. The Prime Minister should also join with the leaders of the other parties in identifying a senior MP (preferably with both ministerial and consensus experience) to take responsibility for following through on the necessary negotiations.

11. The current EE (formerly ENV) Committee is solely a government committee, and there has been no suggestion that the proposed Office for Climate Change would call on other parties, but we suggest that its existence might provide scope for involving other parties in policymaking: perhaps even for exploring a coalition-like approach on climate change. Its likely high profile should, at a minimum, be accompanied by openness in its proceedings and a readiness to listen to ideas from outside government and outside the governing party. In setting it up, ministers could perhaps consider options for formally involving opposition parties, at least in the event of emergencies related to climate change.

12. We recommend that the Government establish an authoritative independent body, similar to the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee, to agree UK climate change targets and measures to meet these, and to report at least annually on progress towards meeting them, in a fully transparent manner and in the light of the best available scientific assessments.

13. We recommend that the proposed climate policy group try to obtain cross-party agreement on the powers that the independent body should have to hold the government of the day to account.

14. We recommend that the proposed climate policy group (Recommendation 10) and the independent body (Recommendation 12) consider whether cross-party support should be given (a) to C&C as an approach to setting international emissions targets, and/or (b) to some form of national carbon-rationing system, such as DTQs, alongside other means, as an instrument for achieving the targets that a C&C cap would impose on the UK.
Consideration of these issues may require further detailed research.