Royal Society Report Proposes a World Nuclear Forum. (October 20, 2011)

The Royal Society has released a report calling for a "World Nuclear Forum" to address issues such as non-proliferation, nuclear governance, and "cradle-to-grave" care of nuclear fuel. According to the report 43 countries currently have nuclear power reactors under construction. Taking an international approach to fuel disposal and storage "may become increasingly important since it is unclear if every nuclear power programme will have the suitable geology and resources to construct and operate a geological disposal facility nationally."

The report discusses best practices for nuclear power programs and makes specific recommendations for Great Britain.

The summary to the 79-page report is reprinted below.

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Many countries worldwide are considering expanding their civilian nuclear power programmes or even embarking on civil nuclear power for the first time to help meet their climate change and energy security needs. Before the earthquake and tsunami hit the Fukushima nuclear power station in Japan, the nuclear industry projected the world was about to enter a period of global expansion in nuclear power. Post-Fukushima, this may still remain valid, although the rate at which nuclear power expands globally may slow.

This so-called ‘nuclear renaissance’ has renewed debate about the relationship between civil nuclear power and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as other security risks. Although civil nuclear power has its history in nuclear weapons, its future is not. In some countries with nuclear weapons, the civil nuclear industry has become solely a provider of electricity. The good track record of international non-proliferation safeguards suggests alternative pathways may be more likely sources of proliferation than the diversion of nuclear material from civil nuclear power programmes. In many countries, the industry has moved from being purely state-run, national companies into multinational enterprises. This increases the transparency of civil nuclear power programmes and this multinational practice should continue. A fully internationalised nuclear fuel cycle and thoroughly multinationalised global nuclear industry may be part of the solution to proliferation, rather than the problem. A World Nuclear Forum is now timely so that CEOs and government leaders can explore their respective views on the future development of nuclear power and responsibilities for non-proliferation and nuclear security.

There is no proliferation proof nuclear fuel cycle. The dual use risk of nuclear knowledge, materials and technology and in civil and military applications cannot be eliminated. The technical expertise of the International Atomic Energy Agency plays a central role in managing this dual use. Improving the efficiency and effectiveness of international safeguards remains a Research and Developement (R&D) priority. It is difficult to assess and easy to exaggerate dual use risks. Risk assessments must be based on a sophisticated understanding of proliferation that appreciates the wider geopolitical system in which nuclear technology is embedded. Assessing what level of risk is acceptable remains ultimately a policy judgment, not a technical one.

Major security incidents, involving non-state individuals or groups, such as criminal networks and terrorist organisations, have been rare. As demonstrated by the attention to nuclear safety post-Fukushima, avoiding complacency is vital to maintain confidence in a nuclear renaissance. An integrated approach to risk assessment and management needs to feature more prominently at all levels of nuclear decision making from the design and regulation of nuclear facilities to the corporate governance of nuclear organisations.

In the rush to construct nuclear reactors, the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste, including planning for its disposal, must no longer be an afterthought. Currently, there is no operating civil geological disposal facility, although disposal plans are well advanced in some countries. The multi-decade to century timescales involved requires long term, strategic planning. The entire fuel cycle needs to be considered from cradle to grave to reduce proliferation and security risks. Long term R&D programmes should be formulated at the outset so that the capacity to manage spent fuel and radioactive wastes can be delivered in a timely way. Furthermore, R&D provides the contingency to address unforeseen changes in policy by keeping future management options open.

A nuclear renaissance has renewed interest in the potential of offering cradle to grave fuel cycle services that couple the supply of fresh fuel with the management of spent fuel and radioactive wastes. Such a comprehensive offer could be attractive to some countries in preference to developing their own national fuel cycle capabilities, thereby providing a key non-proliferation incentive that offers major security benefits. The sensitivities surrounding such arrangements should not be underestimated. This does not mean that governments should reject them. By supporting collaborative R&D to explore these options, governments can keep them open without needing to commit to their implementation at this stage.

The UK’s role in the development of nuclear technology has been declining over the last few decades. The UK’s long term ambitions for nuclear power need to be clearly articulated and implemented if this decline is to be reversed. Enhanced support for the UK’s research infrastructure is necessary if the UK is to remain influential in debates on non-proliferation and nuclear security, and thereby contribute to the responsible stewardship of a global nuclear renaissance.