The US / Indian Nuclear Deal and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. (March 11, 2006)

    Richard Stone and Pallava Bagla writing in the March 10 issue of Science have filled out a number of the missing cogs effecting the proposed nuclear pact between the United States and India which suggests how that may impinge on the Australian government's approach to selling uranium to India, a non-signatory to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).

As part of the agreement with the US, India would open a majority -- but not all -- of its nuclear power plants to international inspections.

The writers in Science point out that the U.S. invitation to trade with the nuclear club is something new and believe it is likely spur other nations to seek concessions from the US.

But of course President  Bush must obtain the approval of the US Congress for the pact to become law, and just at the moment that is not certain.

Negotiations over the deal began last July when Bush and Singh agreed in principle but leaving the details to be determined, which proved difficult -- especially on a provision that India would be allowed to segregate its nuclear program into two categories: civilian facilities open to international inspection and nuclear trade, and military installations -- the latter two excluded.

One March 1, the day Bush arrived in India, agreement was reached that "India would put 14 of 22 planned or existing nuclear power reactors on the civilian list--leaving eight to use for military plutonium and tritium production, if it so desired. India has tagged all other facilities as military and retains the right to decide which future indigenous reactors to place under safeguards, although all reactors imported from now on would be subject to inspections. In the end, India made two key concessions: The 'India-specific' safeguards, yet to be negotiated, would last in perpetuity--as long as countries do not withhold nuclear fuel. Singh told Parliament on 7 March that India would shut down CIRUS [a reactor in Mumbai presumed to have produced plutonium for weapons] in 2010 and relocate Apsara, a light-water reactor, for safeguarding.

Both the Bush administration and the Indian government agree that the deal places no constraints on India's nuclear weapons program. So not unexpectedly Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Washington, D.C. based Arms Control Association was less than enthusiastic, "The Bush Administration is sacrificing or selling out on what until this day have been some core U.S. non-proliferation values."

Finally, Stone and Pallava write, "[US] Congressional approval would likely tumble a row of nuclear dominoes. For one, it would prompt the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group to alter its rules, which for 30 years have prevented members from selling nuclear technology to India. It would also give a green light to India and France to implement a bilateral nuclear deal inked last month. Other nuclear suitors for Indian contracts would soon follow."

It is probable that the US Congress will approve the pact although there may be some constraining amendments written in.

Once signed, it would seem likely that the Australian government, particularly considering the considerable influence of the nation's mining giants, will seek to amend its laws to allow the selling of uranium to India, but just what effect that would have per si on a further weakening of the NPT is a moot question.